Cargill

The Amazon soy frontier did not expand randomly. It expanded along infrastructure. Cargill's Santarém port was the infrastructure. Before the port opened, soy cultivation in the Brazilian Amazon was limited by logistics. The Santarém port — completed in 2003, sitting on the confluence of the Amazon and Tapajós rivers — changed the calculus. Farmers cleared forest, planted soy, and the port loaded it onto ships for China. The economic signal was unmistakable. Greenpeace documented the pattern in its 2006 report 'Eating up the Amazon.' The organization identified Cargill's facility as a central driver of a deforestation surge in the preceding years. Brazilian federal prosecutors had already moved to shut the port, finding that it had been constructed without the required environmental licenses. The port kept operating. The Amazon Soy Moratorium — signed by Cargill and other major commodity traders in 2006 — was negotiated under NGO and Brazilian government pressure specifically because of the documented deforestation. The fact that such a moratorium was deemed necessary is itself the record. The port is still there. The soy still ships. The forest that was cleared is still cleared.

• —2003: Cargill completed deepwater soy processing port at Santarém, Pará, Brazil — at the confluence of the Amazon and Tapajós rivers
• —Port created direct export logistics for soy grown on cleared Amazon land, making deforestation economically rational for Brazilian farmers
• —2006: Brazilian federal prosecutors initiated action to close the port for lack of required environmental licenses
• —2006: Greenpeace published 'Eating up the Amazon' — identified Cargill's Santarém port as primary infrastructure driving soy-fueled Amazon deforestation
• —2006: Amazon Soy Moratorium negotiated among major commodity traders — a direct response to Cargill's documented deforestation role
• —The moratorium's existence is itself documentation of what the port caused
• —Zero executives criminally charged for the deforestation or the unlicensed port operation

Cargill is one of the world's largest cocoa processors. The supply chain for cocoa runs through West Africa, principally Côte d'Ivoire, where an estimated 1.5 million children work on cocoa farms. Cargill has operated in this supply chain, buying from these farms, for decades. In 2005, the International Labor Rights Fund identified Cargill, Nestlé, and Archer Daniels Midland as companies whose purchasing relationships sustained child slavery. The lawsuit alleged trafficking — children recruited under false pretenses, transported across borders, confined, and forced to work without pay under threat of violence. The case that reached the Supreme Court in 2021 involved six Malian children trafficked into Côte d'Ivoire as minors. They alleged that Cargill's field representatives inspected the farms. That Cargill provided fertilizer, equipment, technical training, and cash advances. That Cargill lobbied against legislation that would have required supply chain transparency. That Cargill's purchases were the economic engine that made the farms' operation viable. The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, held that the Alien Tort Statute could not reach conduct that occurred overseas. The court did not hold that the allegations were false. The children did not receive compensation. Cargill's supply chain relationships were not ordered to change by any court. In 2023, a Brazilian court fined Cargill separately for child labor in cocoa harvesting — a different jurisdiction, the same supply chain pattern.

• —Cargill is among the world's largest cocoa processors; its West African supply chain has been under scrutiny for child labor for two decades
• —2005: International Labor Rights Fund sued Cargill, Nestlé, and ADM for trafficking children to Côte d'Ivoire cocoa plantations — work conditions: 12–14 hours/day, no pay
• —2021: Eight formerly enslaved Malian children filed class action. Allegations: Cargill's reps inspected farms; Cargill provided equipment, training, cash advances to farms using child slaves; Cargill lobbied against transparency legislation
• —Supreme Court (Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 2021): 8-1 ruling blocked the case — ATS conduct occurred overseas; factual allegations not disputed by the court
• —The children received no compensation; Cargill's supply chain purchasing relationships unchanged by any court order
• —2023: Brazilian court fined Cargill for child labor in cocoa harvesting — separate jurisdiction, same supply chain pattern
• —Zero executives criminally charged

Colombia's agrarian reform law was written to prevent what Cargill did. After decades of land dispossession, the country enacted caps on land ownership specifically to stop agricultural land from being concentrated in the hands of large foreign corporations. The caps were modest. The intent was clear. Cargill's response was to build 36 shell companies. Between 2010 and 2012, Cargill's local subsidiaries created a structure of 36 separate legal entities in Colombia, each acquiring land parcels that individually stayed within the legal cap. In aggregate, the entities held more than 50,000 hectares of the Colombian llanos — the savannah region where the company planned to develop large-scale grain and oil palm cultivation. The legal limit for a single entity at the time was approximately 1,700 hectares. Cargill's aggregate holding through the shell structure was roughly 30 times that figure. Colombia's Inspector General opened a formal investigation. The case became a documented example of how multinational corporations use corporate structure to circumvent land reform protections designed for small farmers and indigenous communities. The land remains in Cargill's control. No executives were charged.

• —Colombia's agrarian reform law caps corporate land ownership to prevent foreign monopolization of agricultural land and protect small farmers
• —2010–2012: Cargill established 36 shell companies in Colombia; each acquired land parcels individually under the ownership cap
• —Aggregate holding: over 50,000 hectares in the Colombian llanos — approximately 30× the legal limit (~1,700 hectares per entity)
• —Colombia's Inspector General (Procurador General) opened a formal investigation into the shell company structure
• —The scheme was a direct circumvention of land reform law designed specifically to prevent this outcome
• —Zero executives criminally charged

Meatpacking is one of the most dangerous industrial jobs in the United States. Workers — disproportionately immigrant, disproportionately non-union — process cattle and pigs in cold, high-speed environments with elevated rates of injury. Four companies — JBS, Tyson, Cargill, and National Beef — control approximately 80% of US beef processing. When four companies control 80% of a labor market, wage-fixing is straightforward. The class action alleged that Cargill and its competitors coordinated on compensation — sharing salary data and aligning pay rates — to prevent workers from extracting competitive wages. A market with four dominant buyers is not a competitive labor market. The companies allegedly made it less competitive still. Cargill settled for $30 million without admitting wrongdoing. The workers affected — the ones doing the dangerous, cold, high-speed processing that supplies American supermarkets — received settlement payments. The executives who made the coordination decisions were not charged.

• —Cargill, JBS, Tyson Foods, and National Beef control approximately 80% of US beef processing
• —Class action alleged horizontal wage-fixing conspiracy: sharing compensation data and coordinating pay to suppress meatpacking worker wages
• —Workers affected: meatpacking employees in one of the most dangerous industrial sectors in the US, disproportionately immigrant and low-income
• —2024: Cargill settled for $30 million without admitting wrongdoing
• —JBS and Tyson also named as defendants in the broader litigation
• —Zero executives criminally charged for the wage suppression conspiracy