Warren Buffett

In 2003, Berkshire Hathaway paid $1.7 billion to acquire Clayton Homes, the nation's largest manufactured home builder. Buffett expanded it into an end-to-end extraction machine: build the home, sell it through Clayton-owned dealerships operating under 18+ different names to simulate competition, finance it through Clayton's own lenders, insure it through Clayton subsidiaries, repossess it on default — then sell it again. A 2015 joint investigation by the Center for Public Integrity and the Seattle Times documented that 93% of Clayton's loans triggered the federal "higher-priced" disclosure threshold for predatory lending. For all other mobile-home lenders combined, fewer than half of loans met that threshold. Clayton charged rates up to 15%+ — 7 percentage points above typical home loans. Dealers received kickbacks to steer buyers to Vanderbilt financing and were pressured to maintain 70%+ capture rates. Collectors were trained to "be mean or condescending," telling cancer patients to skip medical bills and pay house payments first. Homes were worth less than their sale price 30% of the time at closing. Clayton's loan failure rates were 26–33%. At Berkshire's 2015 annual meeting, Buffett said he had made "no apologies whatsoever about Clayton's lending terms."

• —93% of Clayton loans triggered the federal "higher-priced" mandatory disclosure threshold — vs. <50% for all other mobile-home lenders.
• —Clayton operated under 18+ brand names — Clayton Homes, Vanderbilt, 21st Mortgage, Luv Homes, Oakwood Homes, TruValue Homes — so buyers believed they were shopping competitors.
• —Dealer kickbacks for steering buyers to Vanderbilt financing; management tracked "capture rate" and pressured lots below 70%.
• —Bait-and-switch loan terms: borrowers described promised rates of 7% becoming 12.5%+ at signing.
• —Collection tactics: tell cancer patients to skip medical bills; call relatives and neighbors; tell debtors to "donate plasma."
• —Clayton lobbied successfully to exempt manufactured homes from appraisal requirements under Dodd-Frank — buyers have no independent check on whether a home is worth what they pay.
• —Clayton profitable every year through the Great Recession, generating $558M in pre-tax earnings in 2014.
• —Buffett at 2015 annual meeting: "no apologies whatsoever about Clayton's lending terms." The Omaha World-Herald — also a Berkshire subsidiary — published Clayton's defense.

A December 2015 BuzzFeed News / Seattle Times investigation documented that Clayton Homes and its subsidiaries controlled 72% of all US mobile-home loans made to Black borrowers, 56% to Latinos, and 53% to Native Americans. Minority borrowers earning $75,000–$100,000 per year were charged higher interest rates, on average, than white borrowers earning only $25,000–$50,000 per year. The 0.7+ percentage point racial rate gap was the largest of any major mobile-home lender in the US. Clayton's internal marketing program deliberately targeted ZIP codes with high concentrations of minorities, ran Spanish-language ads promising ITIN-friendly loans — then provided loan documents only in English with no translator at closing. On the Navajo reservation, a Clayton sales agent told Native American women that Vanderbilt was the only lender that finances on the reservation. That was a lie; the Navajo Nation's own credit program offered loans at under 6.5%, roughly half what Clayton was charging. Over a decade, Clayton filed to seize homes 691 times in just eight of the Navajo Nation's 11 court districts. The EEOC filed a federal lawsuit after documented racial hostility in Clayton workplaces; Clayton settled without admitting wrongdoing.

• —Clayton controlled 72% of ALL US mobile-home loans to Black borrowers; 56% to Latino/Hispanic; 53% to Native Americans.
• —Minority borrowers earning $75K–$100K charged more than white borrowers earning $25K–$50K — largest racial rate gap of any major mobile-home lender.
• —Internal marketing program deliberately targeted high-minority ZIP codes; ran Spanish-language ads; provided loan documents only in English.
• —"Vanderbilt is the only one that finances on the reservation" — told to Navajo women on tape. A lie. Navajo Nation credit program offered loans at ~6.5% — half Clayton's rate.
• —691 home seizure filings on the Navajo reservation over a decade (just 8 of 11 court districts).
• —EEOC federal lawsuit: documented racial hostility in multiple states (workers called "Sambo," "Buckwheat," collectors mimicking Black borrowers' speech, calling Navajo borrowers "too stupid"). Clayton settled without admitting wrongdoing.
• —Attorney John Relman, who represented Baltimore against Wells Fargo for reverse redlining: "absolutely classic reverse redlining."
• —Buffett response: declined to discuss racial issues. Turned away a reporter at his home.

In June 2021, ProPublica published a trove of IRS data covering thousands of America's wealthiest individuals. Buffett's numbers from 2014 to 2018: $24.3 billion in wealth growth per Forbes; $23.7 million in federal taxes paid. True tax rate: 0.1%. ProPublica's note was unambiguous: "No one among the 25 wealthiest avoided as much tax as Buffett." The mechanism is simple: Buffett holds Berkshire Hathaway stock and does not sell. Unrealized gains on unsold stock are not taxable income under US law. Berkshire pays no dividend — by Buffett's design. His annual reported income in 2015–2018 ranged from $11.6M to $25M despite being worth over $100 billion. For comparison, the median American household paid a higher proportion of its wealth growth in taxes than Buffett did in absolute dollars. The man who publicly called for higher taxes on billionaires, who named legislation after himself, whose op-ed was titled "Stop Coddling the Super-Rich," structured his own wealth to pay less than a grocery store cashier — proportionally. ProPublica's verdict on the "Buffett Rule": "It wouldn't have raised Buffett's taxes significantly. If you can avoid income, you can avoid taxes."

• —$24.3B in wealth growth (2014–2018, per Forbes); $23.7M in taxes paid. True tax rate: 0.1%.
• —"No one among the 25 wealthiest avoided as much tax as Buffett." — ProPublica, June 2021.
• —Mechanism: Buffett holds Berkshire Hathaway stock and does not sell. No dividends paid by Berkshire, by Buffett's design. Zero realized gains = zero taxable income.
• —Annual reported income 2015–2018: $11.6M to $25M on $100B+ net worth.
• —Buffett's 2011 NYT op-ed: "Stop Coddling the Super-Rich." He highlighted his secretary's higher tax rate to make his point.
• —Obama named the "Buffett Rule" after him — a 30% minimum tax on incomes over $1M. ProPublica: it wouldn't have raised his taxes significantly.
• —The median American household paid a higher proportion of its wealth growth in federal taxes than Buffett paid in absolute dollars.

Berkshire Hathaway Energy (BHE) is the 5th-largest carbon-polluting power company in the United States and the only major US investor-owned utility to have announced no net zero emissions goal — a distinction it holds alone among its peers. PacifiCorp, a BHE subsidiary serving six western states, was generating 48% of its electricity from coal in 2020, with coal plants in its integrated resource plan running beyond 2030. PacifiCorp also owns coal mines that supplied 16% of its coal consumption. In 2020, BHE acquired control of 18% of all US interstate natural gas transmission capacity. Berkshire's insurance subsidiaries underwrite coal, oil, and gas "without any restrictions." In 2021, Berkshire's board actively opposed a shareholder proposal backed by CalPERS and major institutional investors requiring annual climate risk disclosure, arguing the decentralized corporate structure made it impractical. Climate Action 100+ — a coalition managing $54 trillion in assets — assessed 159 major emitting companies and found Berkshire among the few that "totally failed in every criteria." BHE utilities lobbied against distributed solar net metering in three states. In his own 2023 shareholder letter, Buffett acknowledged that wildfires "whose frequency and intensity have increased — and will likely continue to increase" were driving massive financial losses. He continued to oppose binding commitments on emissions.

• —Only major US investor-owned utility with no net zero emissions goal — every other major US investor-owned utility had announced a target by 2021.
• —PacifiCorp: 48% coal-generated electricity in 2020; coal plants running beyond 2030; owns coal mines supplying 16% of its own coal.
• —MidAmerican Energy: markets itself as "100% renewable vision" while operating five coal-fired power plants — single largest polluter in Iowa.
• —BHE acquired 18% of all US interstate natural gas transmission capacity (2020 pipeline acquisition).
• —Board opposed 2021 shareholder climate disclosure proposal backed by CalPERS, Federated Hermes, and Caisse de dépôt.
• —Climate Action 100+ ($54T in assets): Berkshire "totally failed in every criteria."
• —BHE utilities lobbied against distributed solar net metering in Wyoming, Iowa, and Nevada.
• —Insurance subsidiaries: underwrite coal, oil, and gas "without any restrictions" (Insure Our Future coalition).

On Labor Day weekend 2020, wildfires swept through Oregon, killing people and destroying thousands of homes. The cause: PacifiCorp (owned by Berkshire Hathaway Energy) failed to de-energize its power lines during conditions that forecasters had explicitly identified as extreme — low humidity, high winds, dry fuels. PacifiCorp had the tools and the warning. It chose not to act. In June 2023, a Portland jury found PacifiCorp grossly negligent — not merely negligent — for its deliberate disregard of known risk. Initial damages: $645 million to 119 named class representatives, plus $3–$4.5M per plaintiff in non-economic damages. Total claims against PacifiCorp were estimated at $30 billion or more, representing approximately 1,400 individuals and businesses. PacifiCorp's post-verdict legal strategy: contest the class action certification itself. In April 2026, an Oregon appeals court sided with PacifiCorp — overturning the class certification and potentially forcing 1,400 wildfire survivors to restart individual lawsuits from scratch, years after the fires. Simultaneously, PacifiCorp asked FERC to allow it to add $1.7 billion in wildfire costs to transmission rates — passing the financial liability for its gross negligence to the ratepayers it exists to serve.

• —Labor Day 2020: PacifiCorp failed to de-energize power lines during explicitly forecast extreme fire conditions.
• —June 2023: Portland jury verdict — PacifiCorp grossly negligent. Gross negligence (not ordinary negligence) reflects deliberate disregard for known risk.
• —Initial damages: $645M to 119 named class representatives + $3–4.5M per plaintiff in non-economic damages.
• —Total claims: ~$30B+, representing ~1,400 survivors.
• —Post-verdict legal strategy: challenge class certification. April 2026: Oregon appeals court overturned class certification — potentially forcing 1,400 survivors to restart individual suits.
• —Simultaneously: PacifiCorp asked FERC to add $1.7B in wildfire costs to ratepayer transmission rates.
• —Buffett's 2023 shareholder letter: discussed wildfires as climate-driven actuarial problem — no acknowledgment that PacifiCorp's operational decisions were the proximate cause.
• —The loop: opposed climate disclosure → built fossil fuel infrastructure → intensified fire conditions → failed to respond → litigated to delay victims → moved costs to ratepayers.